We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. Within this setup, we ask whether policymakers should interfere when better informed agents make individual investment decisions. We...

Bank loans are more available and cheaper for new and small businesses in the U.S. in areas with highly concentrated banks than in areas with highly competitive banks. To explain this fact, we analyze banks' decisions to screen the project and their subsequent competition in loan provisions. It...

This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. We find that equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible...

This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. We find that equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible...

This paper studies the benefit coming from bundling two sequential activities in a context of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). Differently from previous literature, I introduce a source of asymmetric information in the form of an externality parameter linking the building stage with...

We show that the stock market may fail to aggregate information even if it appears to be efficient and that the resulting decrease in the information content of stock prices may drastically reduce welfare. We solve a macroeconomic model in which information about fundamentals is dispersed and...