Similar Search Results

Distributing the Benefits from the Commons

Silvestre, Joaquim - 1993

"The common-property literature has often focused on the question of efficiency. Here we consider distributional issues instead. How should the benefits of the commons (say, a fishery) be distributed? We approach the question from the viewpoint of ownership rather than income redistribution. "A...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468330

Framework to Analyze the Robustness of Social-Ecological Systems from an Institutional Perspective

Anderies, John M.; Janssen, Marco A.; Ostrom, Elinor - 2004

"What makes social-ecological systems robust? In this paper we look at the institutional configurations that affect the interactions among resources, resource users, public infrastructure providers, and public infrastructures. We propose a framework that helps to identify potential...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468396

Costly Voting: Theoretical and Experimental Results on Commons Dilemmas in Spatial Committee Games

Wilson, Rick K.; Herzberg, Roberta; Elliott, Mark - 1993

"Our focus in this paper is with the transaction costs inherent in most decision making settings. We specifically investigate an "institution free" collective choice mechanism that includes costs to calling votes. A set of models show that under low costs (i.e., where no cost-induced equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468404

Optimality, Sub-optimality, Nirvana, and Transaction Costs Foraging on the Commons

Feeny, David - 1995

Published as Feeny, David, "Sub-Optimality and Transaction Costs on the Commons," in Edna Tusak Loehman and D. Marc Kilgour (eds.), Designing Institutions for Environmental and Resource Management (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 1998), 124-141. "Much of the literature on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468417

The Exchange Commons

Liebenau, Jonathan; de Fontenay, Alain Bourdeau - 2006

"While the conditions of production give some guidance to what factor groupings are desirable ceteris paribus, they do not determine the boundaries of a neoclassical firm (a legal entity with a residual claimant). Indeed, they could just as well be related to other groupings, such as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468315

The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems

Gardner, Roy; Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James M. - 1987

Published as:"The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems," Rationality and Society 2(3), July 1990, 335-358."A large, multidisciplinary literature focuses on the problems occurring when multiple individuals concurrently use common-pool resources such as fisheries, grazing areas, airsheds, oil...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468380

Strategic Manipulation of Pollution Permit Markets: An Experimental Approach

Brown-Kruse, Jamie; Elliott, Steven R.; Godby, Rob - 1995

"In this paper we employ experimental economic methods to examine the effect of market structure on the use of marketable emissions permits. In particular, we ask whether firms can strategically manipulate a product market using marketable emissions permits. Subjects participate in two markets,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468442

Institutions for Facilitating Cooperation: Evidence from Economics Experiments on Public Goods, Common-Pool Resources and Team Production Environments

Walker, James M. - 2003

examine propositions related to static equilibrium theory, dynamic learning models, and individual choice theory. Economic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468447

Network Governance of the Commons

Carlsson, Lars; Sandström, Annica - 2006

closely related to network governance and social network theory, than to political administrative hierarchy. However, so far …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468474

The Missing Link: Collective-Choice Policymaking in Nonprofit, For-Profit, and Public Child Care Centers

Bushouse, Brenda K. - 1999

to explain nonprofit production of certain types of goods. Hansmann (1980, 1986) developed Contract Failure Theory to …. Weisbrod (1977, 1988) developed the theory of Market/Government Failure to explain nonprofit production of collective goods … primary justification for the nonprofit institutional form. In Contract Failure Theory it signals quality to consumers because …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468484