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"Our focus in this paper is with the transaction costs inherent in most decision making settings. We specifically investigate an "institution free" collective choice mechanism that includes costs to calling votes. A set of models show that under low costs (i.e., where no cost-induced equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468404
Published as Feeny, David, "Sub-Optimality and Transaction Costs on the Commons," in Edna Tusak Loehman and D. Marc Kilgour (eds.), Designing Institutions for Environmental and Resource Management (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 1998), 124-141. "Much of the literature on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468417
to explain nonprofit production of certain types of goods. Hansmann (1980, 1986) developed Contract Failure Theory to …. Weisbrod (1977, 1988) developed the theory of Market/Government Failure to explain nonprofit production of collective goods … primary justification for the nonprofit institutional form. In Contract Failure Theory it signals quality to consumers because …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468484
"We are concerned here with the creation of non-market institutions for reducing the cost of risk in poor agrarian societies that operate at low levels of technology without the benefits of insurance, credit and other intertemporal markets. 1 Institutions, the formal and informal rules that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468491
"In this paper we formulate a cost-induced equilibrium concept. This equilibrium is generated from transaction costs connected with a sequential agenda process. Our claim is that most collective choice Institutions carry with them decision costs. If these transaction costs are very large, they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468499