No abstract.

Floating exchange rates display substantial short-run volatility causing a nontrivial information problem in disentangling temporary from permanent changes. Although agents observe current market signals they are imperfectly informed about the future, but they accumulate information and learn...

A fundamental property of a progressive income tax is that it provides implicit collective insurance against idiosyncratic shocks to income by dampening the variability of disposable income and consumption. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86)...

We present a model of private production of information in collective decision making. Agents gather costly information, and then aggregate it to produce a collective decision. Because information is a public good, it will be underprovided relative to the social optimum. A ``good'' mechanism...

This paper analyzes the linear regression model y = xb+e with a conditional median assumption Med( e | z)=0 where z is a vector of instruments. Added complication arises due to the censoring of the outcome y. We treat the censored model as a model with interval-observed outcome thus obtaining...

We consider cooperative arrangements in a fixed community where agents may change partners over time and where public communication is possible. Public monitoring and exogenous information flows are absent: any player's action in any period is observed only by the agent himself and his partner...

No abstract.

This paper studies delegation as an alternative for communication. We show how a principal may give up control rights in order to foster the efficient use of information present in an organization. We point out how the benefits of delegation vary with the congruence between agent and principal,...

We extend the citizen candidate framework by allowing for endogenous party formation. When a party is formed, any member of that party that wants to be a candidate in the election, first has to run in the primary election of her party. We show that in equilibrium one left-wing and one right-wing...

This paper concerns public funding of parties. Two policy motivated parties receive public funds depending on their vote share. Funds finance electoral campaigns influencing voting. Two cases are investigated. In the first some voters are policy motivated and some are ''impressionable'' - their...