We consider two person zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on one side and with payoffs of special “separable” form. The solutions for these games are reduced to the solutions for families of special transportation type problems with recursive structure. We illustrate our...

Abstract. We analyze discounted repeated games with incomplete information, such that the players' payoffs depend only on their own type (known-own payoff case). We describe an algorithm for finding all equilibrium payoffs in games for which there exists an open set of belief-free equilibria of...

We consider an infinitely repeated two-person zero-sum game with incomplete information on one side, in which the maximizer is the (more) informed player. Such games have value v\infty (p) for all 0\leqp\leq1. The informed player can guarantee that all along the game the average payoff per stage...

The recursive formula for the value of the zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on both sides is known for a long time. As it is explained in the paper, the usual proof of this formula is in a sense non constructive : it just claims that the players are unable to guarantee a...

The recursive formula for the value of the zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on both sides is known for a long time. As it is explained in the paper, the usual proof of this formula is in a sense non constructive : it just claims that the players are unable to guarantee a...

We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two players in return for some payment among players. The players are asymmetrically informed about the object’s value and have veto power over any settlement. There is no...