We consider economies with incomplete markets, one good per state, two periods, t=0,1, private ownership of initial endowments, a single firm, and no assets other than shares in this firm. In Dierker, Dierker, Grodal (2002), we give an example of such an economy in which all market equilibria...

General equilibrium theory constitutes a sound basis for the discussion of policy issues if firms do not have market power. However, if firms influence prices strategically, the concept of profits loses its meaning due to the price normalization problem. Hence, it is unclear how to model the...

General equilibrium models of oligopolistic competition give rise to relative prices only without determining the price level. It is well known that the choice of a numéraire or, more generally, of a normalization rule converting relative prices into absolute prices entails drastic consequences...

In this paper we analyze the welfare properties of the set of Drèze equilibria for economies with incomplete markets and firms. The well known fact that a Drèze equilibrium need not be constrained Pareto optimal is often attributed to a lack of coordination between firms. We show that there...

We consider economies with incomplete markets, production, an a given distribution of initial endowments. The main purpose of the paper is to present a robust example of an economy with only one firm and one good per state in which no production decision entails a constrained efficient outcome....

We consider oligopolistic markets in which the notion of shareholders' utility is well-defined and compare the Bertrand-Nash equilibria in case of utility maximization with those under the usual profit maximization hypothesis. Our main result states that profit maximization leads to less price...