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Kräkel, Matthias - University of Bonn, Germany - 2014

In a multi-agent setting, individuals often compare own performance with that of their peers. These comparisons in?uence agents? incentives and lead to a noncooperative game, even if the agents have to complete independent tasks. I show that depending on the interplay of the peer effects,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096536

Understanding "The Problem of Social Cost"

baffi, enrico - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

This paper examines the positions of Coase and Pigou in regard to the problem of external effects (externalities … 1960, Coase’s theory has been developed and has become a pillar of tort law and economics. Pigou proposed a tax as an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260441

Macroeconomics after the crisis – hedgehog or fox?

Miller, Marcus; Zhang, Lei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

‘pecuniary externalities’. Two that affect borrowers and lenders balance sheets in pro-cyclical fashion are described, along with … measures that might help curb their destabilising effects. These ‘pecuniary externalities’ can be thought of as the unintended … Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) – that when externalities are present, leaving things to the market may not be ‘constrained Pareto …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083632

Information-Constrained Optima with Retrading: An Externality and Its Market-Based Solution

Kilenthong, Weerachart; Townsend, Robert - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

This paper studies the efficiency of competitive equilibria in environments with a moral hazard problem and unobserved states, both with retrading in ex post spot markets. The interaction between private information problems and the possibility of retrade creates an externality, unless...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008552807

How Liable should an Exporter be? The Case of Trade in Hazardous Goods

Helm, Carsten - Fachbereich Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, … - 2005

This paper analyzes liability issues in the context of internationally traded goods like hazardous waste. If waste disposers of a small open economy are judgement-proof, then the extension of liability to waste exporters distorts the factor allocation and may reduce disposal care. Hence the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008464637

Contingent Capital; Economic Rationale and Design Features

Pazarbasioglu, Ceyla; Zhou, Jian-Ping; Leslé, Vanessa Le; … - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2011

The causes of the global financial crisis were multi-faceted but revealed still unresolved weaknesses in national and international financial oversight and resolution frameworks. In particular, many governments in the crisis-hit countries had to provide unprecedented levels of support to contain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011245888

Crisis Management and Resolution; Early Lessons from the Financial Crisis

Pazarbasioglu, Ceyla; Laeven, Luc; Nedelescu, Oana M.; … - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2011

Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief and written in nontechnical language, and so are aimed at a broad audience...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011245897

An Analysis of the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit

Claudio, Lucarelli - 2006

Medicare has recently experienced the largest expansion of benefits since its in- ception: the inclusion of prescription drug coverage under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003. The policy debate has mainly focused on estimating the cost of implementing the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009438528

Essays on Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance Market

Wen, Jian - 2010

Essay One examines the asymmetric information problem between primary insurers and reinsurers in the reinsurance industry and contributes uniquely to the separation of adverse selection from moral hazard, if both are present. A two-period principal-agent model is set up to identify the signals...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009463407

Reinsurance Contracting with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard: Theory and Evidence

Yan, Zhiqiang - 2009

This dissertation includes two essays on adverse selection and moral hazard problems in reinsurance markets. The first essay builds a competitive principal-agent model that considers adverse selection and moral hazard jointly, and characterizes graphically various forms of separating Nash...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009463429