We establish a new sufficient condition for avoiding a generalized Anscombe’s paradox. In a situation where votes describe positions regarding finitely many yes-or-no issues, the Anscombe’s α-paradox holds if more than α% of the voters disagree on a majority of issues with the outcome of...

We define generalized (preference) domains <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$\mathcal{D}$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> as subsets of the hypercube {−1,1}<Superscript> D </Superscript>, where each of the D coordinates relates to a yes-no issue. Given a finite set of n individuals, a profile assigns each individual to an element of <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$\mathcal{D}$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>. We prove that, for any domain <InlineEquation ID="IEq3"> <EquationSource...</equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></inlineequation></superscript></equationsource></inlineequation>

We introduce a new consistency condition for neutral social welfare functions, called hyperstability. A social welfare function a selects a complete weak order from a profile PN of linear orders over any finite set of alternatives, given N individuals. Each linear order P in PN generates a...