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In this paper the long-run effects of demand and recharge uncertainty on the socially optimal management of groundwater reserves are studied. Demand uncertainty is modeled in a dynamic framework by letting the demand function shift randomly but continuously through time according to a random...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550418
This article provides a survey of dynamic models of international environmental agreements (IEAs). The focus is on environmental problems that are caused by a stock pollutant as are the cases of the acid rain and climate change. For this reason, the survey only reviews the literature that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010696389
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010856999
This article provides a survey of dynamic models of international environmental agreements (IEAs). The focus is on environmental problems that are caused by a stock pollutant as are the cases of the acid rain and climate change. For this reason, the survey only reviews the literature that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010548942
This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. It is assumed that when countries cooperate they coordinate their investments so as to minimize the agreement costs of controlling emissions and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833931
This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. It is assumed that when countries cooperate they coordinate their investments so as to minimize the agreement costs of controlling emissions....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076794
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005293573
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005293580
In this paper a two-stage game of international environmental agreement formation with asymmetric countries is analytically solved. The equilibrium of the game makes it possible to determine the size and composition of a stable agreement. Two cases are studied. In the first case, countries...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008483137
Barrett's (1994) paper on transboundary pollution abatement shows that if the signatories of an international environmental agreement act in a Stackelberg fashion, then, depending on parameter values, a self-enforcing IEA can have any number of signatories between two and the grand coalition....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005564446