<Para ID="Par1">Recent research invokes preference imprecision to explain violations of individual decision theory. While these inquiries are suggestive, the nature and significance of such imprecision remain poorly understood. We explore three questions using a new measurement tool in an experimental...</para>

This paper reports data from three subject pools (n=717 subjects) using techniques based on those of Loewenstein, et al. (1989) and Blanco, et al. (2011) to obtain parameters, respectively, of stated and revealed inequality aversion. We provide a replication opportunity for those papers, with...

The exchange between Epstein (2010) and Klibanoff et al. (2012) identified a behavioral issue that sharply distinguishes between two classes of models of ambiguity sensitivity, exemplified by the Î±-MEU model and the smooth ambiguity model, respectively. The issue in question is whether a...

The game-theoretic assumption of ‘common knowledge of rationality’ leads to paradoxes when rationality is represented in a Bayesian framework as cautious expected utility maximisation with independent beliefs (ICEU). We diagnose and resolve these paradoxes by presenting a new class of formal...

The paper reports an experiment which tests the principle of separability, i.e. that behaviour in a dynamic choice problem is independent of history and of unreachable eventualities. Although this is a standard principle of decision theory, it can be questioned on grounds suggested by...

In the last thirty years economists and other social scientists investigated people’s normative views on principles of distributive justice. Here we study people’s normative views in social dilemmas, which underlie many situations of economic and social significance. Using insights from...

The paper considers the problems of interpreting subjects’ responses to laboratory intertemporal choice and matching tasks that arise from (i) the existence of capital markets outside the laboratory; (ii) the distinction between observable income and unobservable consumption. It distinguishes...

The game-theoretic assumption of ‘common knowledge of rationality’ leads to paradoxes when rationality is represented in a Bayesian framework as cautious expected utility maximization with independent beliefs (ICEU). We diagnose and resolve these paradoxes by presenting a new class of formal...