We analyse a non-zero sum two-person game introduced by Teraoka and Yamada to model the strategic aspects of production development in manufacturing. In particular we investigate how sensitive their solution concept (Nash equilibrium) is to small variations in their assumptions. It is proved...

We analyse a non-zero sum two-person game introduced by Teraoka and Yamada to model the strategic aspects of production development in manufacturing. In particular we investigate how sensitive their solution concept (Nash equilibrium) is to small variations in their assumptions. It is proved...

The division of a cake by two players is modelled by means of a game of timing in which the players have a probability of learning when their opponent acts. It is shown that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium when both players are non-noisy but that there are many Nash equilibria including...

The division of a cake by two players is modelled by means of a game of timing in which the players have a probability of learning when their opponent acts. It is shown that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium when both players are non-noisy but that there are many Nash equilibria including...

An infiltrator tries to go through a graph of n arcs, within a time limit, without being caught by a guard. The latter is allowed a restricted number of tentatives to catch the infiltrator. This paper describes optimal strategies and gives the value of this discrete zero-sum infiltration game.

Stackelberg models for hierarchical oligopolistic markets with a homogenous product were studied by researchers extensively. The goal of this paper is to extend the classical solution in closed form of the Stackelberg model for a general hierarchical structures composed by firms arranged into...

We introduce a search game in which a hider has partial information about a searcher's resource. The hider can be a terrorist trying to hide and the searcher can be special forces trying to catch him. The terrorist does not know the number of forces involved in the search but just its...

<Para ID="Par1">In this paper we suggest a new class of search games, namely, screening and hiding versus search games. This new class of search games is motivated by the book Search and Screening by Koopman who is the founder of the modern search theory. In our game a hider is not just trying to find the best...</para>