Good corporate governance depends on well balanced relations between supervisory mechanisms in the corporate governance process. Relations between the supervisory board, as the internal supervisory mechanism, and external auditing, as the external supervisory mechanism, are crucial for the...

Over the last 10 - 15 years significant changes took place in principal systems of corporate governance i.e. in the Anglo-Saxon and German systems. These changes were of similar or the same character. This was an effect of economic crises, mainly crises of 1997 – 1998 and 2007 – 2009. The...

Good corporate governance depends on well balanced relations between supervisory mechanisms in the corporate governance process. Relations between the supervisory board, as the internal supervisory mechanism, and external auditing, as the external supervisory mechanism, are crucial for the...

As a rule, public companies in the Republic of Slovenia use a twotier system of corporate governance. The supervisory boards of such companies should execute the supervisory function by informing and disclosing to the shareholders the data regarding envisaged policies of corporate governance....

Over the last 10 - 15 years significant changes took place in principal systems of corporate governance i.e. in the Anglo-Saxon and German systems. These changes were of similar or the same character. This was an effect of economic crises, mainly crises of 1997 – 1998 and 2007 – 2009. The...

This article investigates the determinants of boards’ financial expertise using a sample of 95 non-financial French listed firms.

This paper examines whether the audit quality of Chinese listed companies is affected by internal governance mechanisms (IGMs). The dataset comprises 443 firm-year observations during 2002-2005. The results show that foreign ownership concentration and the number of professional supervisors are...

Contemporary governance reform proposals focus on strengthening board monitoring but recent theoretical models find that a passive board is often optimal. We examine board structure choice in France where for 45 years firms have been free to choose between a unitary board and a dual board...

Many governance reform proposals focus on strengthening board monitoring. In contrast, Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008) conclude that a passive board is often optimal. We examine determinants of board structure choice in France, where firms are free to choose between a...