This paper introduces tau-fairness as a compromise solution reconciling Pareto efficiency and equity in School Choice Problems. We show that, by considering a weak notion of equity that we refer to as lambda-equity, it is possible to contribute positively to solve an open debate, originated by...

This paper provides an `escape route' from the efficiency-equity trade-off in the School Choice problem. We achieve our objective by presenting a weak notion of fairness, called τ-fairness, which is always satisfied by some allocation. Then, we propose the adoption of the Student Optimal...

We implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium using a simplesequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker (in the first stage). Then ,each worker accepts at most one proposal (second stage). Moreover, we show that, if agents'preferences are additive,...

This paper introduces &tao;-fairness as a compromise solution reconciling Pareto efficiency and equity in School Choice Problems. We show that, by considering a weak notion of equity that we refer to as ¿-equity, it is possible to contribute positively to solve an open debate, originated by the...

This paper provides three simple mechanisms to implement allocations in the core of matching markets. We analyze some sequential mechanisms which mimic matching procedures for many-to-one real life matching markets. We show that only core allocations should be attained when agents act...