This paper examines the optimality of export subsidies in oligopolistic markets, when home and foreign fires have different costs and there is an opportunity cost to public funds. Subsidies are found to be optimal only for surprisingly lou values of the shadow price of government funds and, if...

We examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R&D and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of agents to commit intertemporally are considered. We show that the home export...

We characterize optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg...

This article presents a model that provides an economic rationale for multilateral agreements, such as the WTO, that prohibit export subsidies. The model is a multicountry version of the well-known Brander and Spencer (Journal of International Economics (1985) 18, 83–100) analysis of...

This paper examines the optimality of export subsidies in oligopolistic markets, when home and foreign firms have different costs and there is an opportunity cost to public funds. Subsidies are found to be optimal only for surprisingly low values of the shadow price of government funds, and if...

In this paper characterise optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by...

We investigate whether a welfare-maximizing government ought to pursue a programme of strategic trade intervention or instead commit itself to free trade when, in the former case, domestic firms will have an opportunity to manipulate the government’s choice of the level of intervention....

This paper is concerned with comparing adversarial with co-operative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other's R&D. Because the government cannot commit to...