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In this paper we study situations where asymmetric players have restricted possibilities for communication. Extreme asymmetry results in a hierarchy among the players. We introduce a class of allocation rules for these situations inspired by the Myerson value (Myerson (1977)) and Shapley values...
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In this paper we study situations where asymmetric players have restricted possibilities for communication. Extreme asymmetry results in a hierarchy among the players. We introduce a class of allocation rules for these situations inspired by the Myerson value (Myerson (1977)) and Shapley values...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010759200
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Network situations as introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) incorporate the influence of the architecture of a network rather than just the connectivity it provides and thereby provide a more flexible setting than communication situations, which consist of a game with transferable utility...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010580886
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Determining the productivity of individual workers engaged in team production is difficult. Monitoring expenses may be high, or the observable output of the entire team may be some single product. One way to collect information about individual productivity is to observe how total output changes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081021