We consider asymmetric winner-reimbursed contests. It turns out that such contests (Sad-Loser) have multiple internal pure-strategy equilibria (where at least two players are active). We describe all equilibria and discuss their properties. In particular, we find (1) that an active player is...

We consider implementation issues regarding two mechanisms that have been used to increase voter turnout in elections: fines and lotteries. We focus on the amount of the fine or lottery prize needed to achieve full participation. We then propose a combined, self-financing mechanism by which the...

We study a 2-player Blotto game where the n items have asymmetric values. The winner of each item is determined stochastically using a lottery mechanism. We analyze two payoff objectives: (i) players maximize their total expected payoffs and (ii) players maximize their probability of winning a...

We study two provisional fixed-prize mechanisms for funding public goods: an all-pay auction and a lottery. In our setting, the public good is provided only if the participants' contributions are greater than the fixed-prize value; otherwise contributions are refunded. We prove that in this...

In this article we consider a model where boundedly rational agents choose both which coordination game to play and what action to take in that game, when their information and mobility are limited and changes over time. We completely characterize both short-run and long-run outcomes. There are...

We consider two-round elimination tournaments where players have fixed resources instead of cost functions. Two approaches are suggested. If the players have the same resources and a success function is stochastic, then players always spend more resources in the first than in the second round in...

We consider a Blotto game with Incomplete Information. A pure-strategy symmetric monotonic Bayesian equilibrium is found and its properties are discussed.