We model pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security systems as the outcome of majority voting within a standard OLG model with production and an exogenous population growth rate. At each point in time individuals work, save, consume and invest by taking the social security policy as given. The latter...

We model PAYG social security systems as the outcome of majority voting within a OLG model with production. When voting, individuals make two choices: pay the elderly their pensions or default. which amount to promise themselves next period. Under general circumstances, there exist equilibria...

In this paper we study the indeterminacy of equilibria in infinite horizon capital accumulation models with technological externalities. Our investigation encompasses both models with bounded and unbounded accumulation paths, and models with one and two sectors of production. Under reasonable...

In this paper we study the indeterminacy of equilibria in infinite horizon capital accumulation models with technological externalities. Our investigation encompasses both models with bounded and unbounded accumulation paths, and models with one and two sectors of production. Under reasonable...

We develop a model which accounts for the observed equity premium and average risk free rate, without implying counterfactually high risk aversion. The model also does well in accounting for business cycle phenomena.

In a common agency game a set of principals promises monetary transfers to an agent which depend on the action he will take. The agent then chooses the action, and is paid the corresponding transfers. Principals announce their transfers simultaneously. This game has many equilibria; Bernheim and...

Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006), in an Anscombe–Aumann framework, axiomatically characterize preferences that are represented by the variational utility functional V(f)=minp∈Δ{∫u(f)dp+c(p)}∀f∈F, where u is a utility function on outcomes and c  is an index of...