We study network games with linear best-replies and strategic complementarities. We assume that actions are continuous but bounded from above. We show that there is always a unique equilibrium. We find that two key features of these games under small network effects may not hold when network...

We provide the first theoretical analysis of altruism in networks. Agents are embedded in a fixed, weighted network and care about their direct friends. Given some initial distribution of incomes, they may decide to support their poorer friends. We study the resulting non-cooperative transfer...

We provide new results regarding the identification of peer effects. We consider an extended version of the linear-in-means model where each individual has his own specific reference group. Interactions are thus structured through a social network. We assume that correlated unobservables are...

We study a setting in which individual players choose their partners as well as a mode of behavior in 2×2 anti-coordination games – games where a player’s best response is to choose an action unlike that of her partner. We characterize the equilibrium networks as well as study the effects...

We provide new results regarding the identification of peer effects. We consider an extended version of the linear-in-means model where each individual has his own specific reference group. Interactions are thus structured through a social network. We assume that correlated unobservables are...

We provide new results regarding the identification of peer effects. We consider an extended version of the linear-in-means model where interactions are structured through a social network. We assume that correlated unobservables are either absent, or treated as network fixed effects. We provide...

In this paper, we propose new solutions to the well-known problem of identification of social effects. Manski (1993) showed that endogenous and contextual (or exogenous) social effects cannot, in general, be disentangled in the linear-in-means model. Our main innovation is that we allow...

In a social network, agents have their own reference group which may influence their behaviour. In turn, the agents' attributes and their behaviour affect the formation and the structure of the social network. This paper surveys the econometric literature on both aspects of social networks, and...