Abstract In this paper, we argue that there is strategic complementarity in criminal behavior. Strategic complementarity arises because the apprehension probability that affects the crime rate depends on the crime rate itself. The natural consequence is the possible multiplicity of the...

We formulate a pretrial negotiation problem as an infinite horizon bargaining model with one-sided uncertainty and alternating offers, with the informed party having an outside option. The plaintiff has private information and also has an outside option of quot;going to court.quot; The defendant...

This paper presents a model of quantity regulation as a policy variable when regulation enforcement is imperfect. The model provides a counterintuitive result: that equilibrium congestion can become worse as the quantity restriction becomes more severe. Intuitively, stricter regulation makes the...

In this paper we assert that, if an offender can dispose of some or all of his wealth after violating the law, raising the fine up to his wealth level will induce him to dispose of his wealth, thereby increasing social cost without deterring more offenses. This suggests that the socially optimal...