Local officials in China have strongly supported new non-state firms, yet other officials in transition countries have often strongly hindered them. We argue that a likely cause of these sharp differences in behaviour is differences in the source of government revenue. Local revenue in China...

This paper highlights the trade-off between the need to restructure a company and the need to provide managers with appropriate incentives to run it after the restructuring. In order to provide incentives, it is optimal to let managers acquire equity in the firm. However, the expectations to be...

The long literature of former socialist systems concludes that any effort to reform the economy without drastic political change is believed to be doomed to fail because tight political control and nonmarket coordination mechanisms are intertwined with each other. Indeed, the history of economic...

China's economic performance of the past two decades presents a puzzle for the economics of transition and development: Enormous private business incentives were unleashed that have fueled rapid economic growth despite the fact that China has had very weak "conventional institutions" (such as...

We analyze optimal schemes for privatization in a transitional economy. In many cases, established Western firms are good candidates for large shareholders of a local firm, since the sale of the shares can generate large amount of revenues and furthermore, in the future, the home country can...

The paper studies the role of risk arbitrage in takeover contests. We show that arbitrageurs have an incentive to accumulate non-trivial stakes in a company target of a takeover. For each arbitrageur, the knowledge of his own presence (and that he will tender a positive fraction of his shares)...

During transition, maintaining employment and providing a social safety net for the unemployed are important to social stability, which in turn is crucial for the productivity of the whole economy. Because independent institutions for social safety are lacking and firms with strong profit...

Before the transition governments had strong distributional objectives, which they pursued mainly by direct controls over state enterprise wage rates and hiring decisions, yielding a highly compressed wage distribution. During the reform they maintained similar controls over state enterprises,...