We model environmental interaction among countries as a policy game where governments in each country use quotas or taxes as strategy variables. The environmental policy has a triple role to play: targeting domestic emissions, providing strategic advantages for domestic firms and targeting...

We model environmental interaction among countries as a policy game where government in each country use quotas or taxes as a strategy variables. The environmental policy has a triple role to play : targeting domestic emission, providing strategic advantages for domestic firms and targeting...

We model environmental interaction among countries as a policy game where governments in each country use quotas or taxes as strategy variables. The environmental policy has a triple role to play: targeting domestic emissions, providing strategic advantages for domestic firms and targeting...

This paper analyzes the consequences of lobby group activity for policy outcomes in economies with transboundary pollution and international environmental policies. In our framework, international environmental policies are characterized as pollution taxes determined in a negotiation between two...

This paper analyzes consequences of lobby group activity for policy outcomes in economies with transboundary pollution and international environmental policies. International environmental policies are here characterized as pollution taxes determined in a negotiation between two countries. The...