We model long-term care insurance in an optimal taxation framework. Every adult decides upon the amount and type of care he purchases for his dependent parent. We consider two alternatives: nursing-home care provided by the government and home-care paid by the child with some lump-sum subsidy by...

We model long-term care insurance in an optimal taxation framework. Every adult decides upon the amount and type of care he purchases for his dependent parent. We consider two alternatives: nursing-home care provided by the government and home-care paid by the child with some lump-sum subsidy by...

We model long-term care insurance in an optimal taxation framework. Every adult decides upon the amount and type of care he purchases for his dependent parent. We consider two alternatives: nursing-home care provided by the government, and home care paid by the child with some lump-sum subsidy...

We consider a health insurance model with heterogeneous agents who only differ in illness severity. The public insurer intends to maximize the expected utility of people insured taking into account the premium paid by them to balance the insurer's budget. Without any ex post moral hazard, the...

This Paper starts from the result of Rochet (1989), that with distortionary income taxes social insurance is a desirable redistributive device when risk and ability are negatively correlated. This finding is re-examined when ex post moral hazard and adverse selection are included, and under...