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Competition with hidden knowledge

Riley, John G. - In: Journal of political economy 93 (1985) 5, pp. 958-976

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002701913

The market mechanism as an incentive scheme

Hart, Oliver D. - In: The Bell journal of economics 14 (1983) 2, pp. 366-382

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002839768

The economic theory of bureaucracy, x-inefficiency and Wagner's law : a note

Cullis, John G.; Jones, Philip R. - In: Public finance 39 (1984) 2, pp. 191-201

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002038124

An equilibrium queuing model of bribery

Lui, Francis T. - In: Journal of political economy 93 (1985) 4, pp. 760-781

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002414630

Incentive provision and coordination as market functions

Roemer, John E. - In: Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung - Journal for … 43 (2010) 1, pp. 6-16

"The market has both a coordination function and an incentive function. The first theorem of welfare economics is all about coordination; the principal-agent model is all about incentives. What is the relative importance of the market in carrying out these two functions? While there has been a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010732053