We adopt the Shapley value approach to examine the fair allocation of the depreciation and amortization charges among the time periods of the asset's useful life. Essentially, the allocation under the Shapley value solution rewards each time period of the asset's useful life with a share of the...

We propose a simple axiomatic system that any depreciation and amortization method - complying with the recent developments in the guidelines set by GAAP and IASB - must obey. The system is consistent with both the matching and the impairment principles. We show that none of the prevalent...

We propose a partial ordering of quot;unpredictable mobilityquot; based on Blackwell's ordering of Markov (information) matrices. This partial ordering ranks mobility matrices according to the degree to which elements in a given set are likely to transit from one state to another, independently...

We analyze the optimal voting rule for co-owners whose future debates are resolved by voting. Each co-owner independently forms an ex ante expectation regarding the likelihood of each member to favor any arbitrary future proposal. We examine the conditions under which a co-owner optimally opts...

Does there exist a voting rule to be, for example, inserted into the constitution of a newly constructed apartment building, which is likely to attract the greatest number of consumers? We analyze this and other questions within a framework in which co-owners resolve future debates by voting. We...

When there is asymmetric information regarding the quality of a traded durable asset, the informed seller might signal asset quality to prospective uninformed buyers by investing in improvements and maintenance. In contrast to Spence (1973), however, this signal may be productive. We derive...

The signaling model of Spence (1973a) and the screening model of Rothchild-Stiglitz (1976) have been separately used to explain economic phenomena when there is asymmetric information. In the real world, however, situations of asymmetric information often simultaneously involve signaling and...

In this paper, we combine direct arbitrage arguments and an option-pricing approach to develop a method of pricing the option for rent control. For a lump-sum payment of key money, a tenant acquires the right to rent a real estate unit for an exogenously determined controlled rent, as opposed to...

The signaling model of Spence (1973a) and the screening model of Rothchild-Stiglitz (1976) have been separately used to explain economic phenomena when there is asymmetric information. In the real world, however, situations of asymmetric information often simultaneously involve signaling and...

We analyze the brokerage service cost allocation in the rental housing market. We explain the alleged inconsistent phenomenon of landlords only occasionally requiring tenants to incur mediation cost. We show that when asymmetric information is introduced,under which tenants' tenure horizon is...