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We investigate refinements of two solutions, the saddle and the weak saddle, defined by Shapley (1964) for two-player zero-sum games. Applied to weak tournaments, the first refinement, the mixed saddle, is unique and gives us a new solution, generally lying between the GETCHA and GOTCHA sets of...
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The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of social-choice rules assumes resoluteness: there are no ties, no multi-member choice sets. Generalizations based on a familiar lottery idea allow ties but assume perfectly shared probabilistic beliefs about their resolution. We prove a...
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Gibbard has shown that a social choice function is strategy-proof if and only if it is a convex combination of dictatorships and pair-wise social choice functions. I use geometric techniques to prove the corollary that every strategy-proof and sovereign social choice function is a random...
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Gibbard has shown that a social choice function is strategy-proof if and only if it is a convex combination of dictatorships and pair-wise social choice functions. I use geometric techniques to prove the corollary that every strategy-proof and sovereign social choice function is a random...
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