This paper studies corporate governance when a firm faces imperfect competition. We derive firms' decisions from utility maximization by individuals. This reduces the usual monopoly distortion. We find that corporate governance can effect the equilibrium in the product (or input) markets. This...

We study a decision-maker who follows the Savage axioms. We show that if s(he) is able to take unobservable actions which influence the probabilities of outcomes then it can appear to an outsider as if his/her subjective probabilities are non-additive. Implications for multi-period decisions are...

This paper studies corporate governance when a firm operates in imperfect markets. We derive firms' decisions from utility maximization by individuals. This reduces the usual monopoly distortion. Corporate governance can effect the equilibrium in the product (or input) markets. This enables us...

The authors assume that a decisionmaker has expected utility preferences over a large space which includes some variables not observable by the theorist. These will induce preferences over observable variables, which typically will not have the expected utility form. This paper focuses on...

We consider an economy in which firms' decisions are made by a collective decision of the shareholders. The main result shows that the simultaneous existence of an exchange equilibrium in the market for shares and a voting equilibrium in the internal decisions of firms. We present our results in...

The arbitrage pricing theorem of finance shows that in certain circumstances the price of a financial asset may be written as a linear combination of the prices of certain market factors. This result is usually proved with von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences. In this paper we show that the...