This article analyses the effects of economic transparency on the optimal monetary policy in an economy affected by demand shocks. In an environment of imperfect common knowledge, demand shocks create a trade-off between stabilizing the price level and stabilizing the output gap. The monetary...

Financial markets are known for overreacting to public information. Central banks can reduce this overreaction either by disclosing information to only a fraction of market participants (partial publicity) or by disclosing information to all participants but with ambiguity (partial...

Financial markets are known for overreacting to public information. Central banks can reduce this overreaction either by disclosing information to a fraction of market participants only (partial publicity) or by disclosing information to all participants but with ambiguity (partial...

This paper argues that a central bank’s optimal policy in response to a cost-push shock depends upon its disclosure regime. More precisely, a credible central bank may find it optimal to implement an accommodative monetary policy in response to a positive cost-push shock whenever the...

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of economic transparency in the conduct of monetary policy. We propose a model of monopolistic competition with imperfect common knowledge on the shocks affecting the economy where the central bank has no inflationary bias. In this context, monetary policy...

The accommodating monetary policy of the 70s is usually rationalized within the Barro-Gordon framework. By contrast, this article shows that, even in the absence of inflationary bias, a credible central bank finds it optimal to accommodate monetary policy in response to cost-push shocks whenever...