We show that when firms have incomplete information about the market demand and their costs, a (Bayesian) Cournot equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist, or be unique. In fact, we are able to construct surprisingly simple and robust examples of duopolies with these features. However, we...

We study upper semi-continuity of the private and coarse core and the Walrasian expectations equilibrium correspondences for economies with differential information, with Boylan (1971) topology on agents’ information fields. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Under standard assumptions about players'cost functions, we show that a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure strategy equilibrium. Next we study Tullock contests in which players have a common value and a common state-independent linear cost function. A two-player contest in...

We show that under standard assumptions a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium. Moreover, two-player common-value Tullock contests in which one of the players has an information advantage have a unique equilibrium. In equilibrium both players exert...

We study the core of a non-atomic game v which is uniformly continuous with respect to the DNA-topology and continuous at the grand coalition. Such a game has a unique DNA-continuous extension ${\overline {v}}$ on the space B1 of ideal sets. We show that if the extension ${\overline {v}}$ is...

We study the Mas-Colell bargaining set of an exchange economy with differential information and a continuum of traders. We established the equivalence of the private bargaining set and the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations. As for the weak fine bargaining set, we show that it...

We study the core and competitive allocations in exchange economies with a continuum of traders and differential information. We show that if the economy is "irreducible", then a competitive equilibrium, in the sense of Radner (1968, 1982), exists. Moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium...