This paper reports a 3-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the first two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects’ social and reciprocity concerns, together with their beliefs. In the last phase, four principals, who face four teams of two agents, compete...

This paper reports a three-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the first two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects' social and reciprocity concerns. In the last phase, four principals compete by offering agents a contract from a fixed menu. Then, agents...

This paper studies convergence and stability properties of Sjostrom's (1994) mechanism, under the assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilbrium using monotonic learning dynamics and best-reply dynamics. This mechanism implements most social choice functions in economic...

This paper studies convergence and stability properties of Sjostrom's (1994) mechanism, under the assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilibrium using monotonic evolutionary dynamics and best-reply dynamics. This mechanism implements most social choice functions in...

This paper is concerned with the realism of mechanisms that implement social choice functions in the traditional sense. Will agents actually play the equilibrium assumed by the analysis? As an example, we study convergence and stability prop-erties of Sjostrom's (1994) mechanism, on the...

This paper is concerned with the realism of mechanisms that implement social choice functions in the traditional sense. Will the agents actually play the equilibrium assumed by the analysis? As an example, we study the dynamic implementation of the first-best solution for the so-called King...

In the literature on vertical relations little attention has been paid to the tole of strategic uncertainty, that is, the presence of multiple self-enforcing outcomes which might lead to coordination failure. However, if firms have some degree of freedom in designing the industrial relations...

This paper is concerned with the evolutionary stability of social inequality structures. We study the evolution of a population whose members compare their relative wealth to coordinate their actions in a simple tacit bargaining game. We interpret the equilibrium behaviors that players may adopt...