in an experiment where subjects repeatedly play a two-player binary “trust” game. Players are randomly and anonymously … emerges under the most extreme information restriction (anonymous community-wide enforcement) or whether trust and reciprocity … require additional, individual-specific information about a player’s past history of play and whether that information must be …

analyze two informational conditions, relative to a Baseline (BSL) in which the unique available information is the relevant … statistic (team average and team minimum). In the Full Information (FI) condition, subjects get the ranked vector of … contributions. In the Traceable Full Information (TFI) condition, subjects are able to trace back individual contributions over time …

two mechanisms to uphold reputation that are generally unavailable to isolated individuals: information sharing and in …-group punishment. In this paper, we design a laboratory experiment to distinguish the roles of these two mechanisms in sustaining group … reputation and increasing gains from trade. We nd that information sharing encourages path dependence via group reputation; good …

two mechanisms to uphold reputation that are generally unavailable to isolated individuals: information sharing and in …-group punishment. In this paper, we design a laboratory experiment to distinguish the roles of these two mechanisms in sustaining group … reputation and increasing gains from trade. We find that information sharing encourages path dependence via group reputation …

run such mechanisms may be optimal, in the long run ineffcient institutions may persist because information about changes … certification is adopted, information embedded in market primitives is eliminated. This leads to the persistence of certification …