In this paper we provide a simple model examining the choice between enforceable and non-enforceable contracts when, on the one hand, drafting an enforceable contract is costly and, on the other hand, fulfilling a non-enforceable contract is left to parties’ fairness. According to the previous...

Starting from the medieval period, women in the Italian Alps experienced a progressive erosion in property rights over the commons. We collected documents about the evolution of inheritance regulations on collective land issued by hundreds of peasant communities over a period of six centuries...

This paper provides a within-country analysis of the impact of corruption on economic growth using a panel of Italian regions from 1968 to 2011 through a robust measure of corruption. This measure is averaged over 5-year periods to reduce short-run fluctuations and to reduce probable delayed...

<em>The Impact of Technological Change on Incentive Provision</em> - The simple trade-off between incentive and risk, which is crucial to the agency problem, is not a sufficient explanation for the ineffectiveness of a specific output-related pay such as the contract system adopted in the US iron and...

<em>Agency Theory and Work Incentives</em> (by Maurizio Lisciandra) - ABSTRACT: This paper is an extensive review of agency theory applied to labour incentives. It introduces a generalised principal-agent model that goes through a certain degree of critical assessment. The analysis of the optimality...

In an open economy with common property resources at the community level, marriage and migratory decisions crucially depend on inheritance rules on the commons. Motivated by the traditional management of the commons in the Italian Alps, we present a model that fits the evolution of property...