A widely known theory of predation holds that firms with ample financial resources may prey on their financially weak rivals to drive them out of the market. Yet, rational weak firms should take this predatory threat into account when designing its financial liabilities. In this paper, we...

This paper analyzes a mixed oligopoly in which firms may hire managers and delegate their decisions to them for strategic reasons. Unlike previous research, we examine the case in which a public firm competes with a foreign firm and a domestic firm, both of them private. We show that these two...

In a relatively recent paper, Gehrig and Stenbacka (Eur Econ Rev 51, 77–99, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">2007</CitationRef>) show that information sharing increases banks’ profits to the detriment of creditworthy entrepreneurs in a model of a banking duopoly with switching costs and poaching. They restrict their analysis to the case...</citationref>

This paper analyzes a mixed duopoly in which a public firm and a (possibly partially) foreign-owned firm choose their capacity scales before competing in quantities. We show that the private firm chooses over-capacity, as in previous literature, except if it is completely foreign-owned. In this...