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Will the fact that a person is selected among others on the basis of personal information affect that person's behavior? In our experiment participants first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game: one of the three players decides, after inspecting the personality...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547429
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007225786
We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765200
We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010983726
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005166067
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005252197
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007223007
We consider a sequential two-party bargaining game with uncertain information transmission. When the first mover states her demand she does only know the probability with which the second mover will be informed about it. The informed second mover can either accept or reject the offer and payoffs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005543005
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010983833
In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishment rule in a public good setting. We show that under all punishment rules cooperation is stronger and more sustainable than reported from settings without punishment. Moreover, we present evidence and explanations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956584