This paper provides an explanation for the observation that banks hold on average a capital ratio in excess of regulatory requirements. We use a functional approach to banking based on Diamond and Rajan (2001) to demonstrate that banks can use capital ratios as a strategic tool for renegotiating...

This paper compares bank regulation and supervision in Japan and Germany. We consider these countries because they both have bank-dominated financial systems and their banking systems are often lumped together as one model, yet, bank stability differs significantly. We show that Japan and...

This paper describes and compares the regulation and supervision of banks in Japan and Germany. We have chosen these countries because they have both bank-dominated financial systems and belong to the same law tradition, yet, bank stability differs significantly. We ask to what extent these...

This paper provides an explanation for the observation that banks hold on average a capital ratio in excess of regulatory requirements. We use a functional approach to banking based on Diamond and Rajan (2001) to demonstrate that banks can use capital ratios as a strategic tool for renegotiating...