Among the most puzzling observations for the euro money market are the bid shading in the weekly refinancing operations and the development of interest rate spreads. To explain these observations, we consider a standard divisible-good auction agrave; la Klemperer and Meyer (1989) with uniform or...

When investments are specific to a relationship and contracting possibilities are incomplete, the efficiency of a joint venture may be severely impaired by ex-post opportunistic and hold-up type behavior. How is the logic of this argument affected by inequity aversion? In this paper I show that...

In many developed countries, an essential part of a bank's capital requirement may be directly tied to a risk figure taken from the bank's own risk model. When capital is scarce, this creates a conflict of interests because the bank's management may want to manipulate its internal risk model in...

Some of the best-known results in mechanism design depend critically on Myerson’s (Math Oper Res 6:58–73, <CitationRef CitationID="CR22">1981</CitationRef>) regularity condition. For example, the second-price auction with reserve price is revenue maximizing only if the type distribution is regular. This paper offers two main findings....</citationref>

It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.

A consistent pair specifies a set of "rational" strategies for both players such that a strategy is rational if and only if it is a best reply to a Bayesian belief that gives positive probability to every rational strategy of the opponent and probability zero otherwise. Although the idea...

This paper contributes to the existing literature on central bank repoauctions. It is based on a structural econometric approach, whereby the primitives of bidding behavior (individual bid schedules and bid-shading components) are directly estimated. With the estimated parameters we calibrate a...

In competitive procurement auctions, bids often have the form of unit-price contracts (UPCs). We show that optimal bidding behavior in UPC auctions is typically nonmonotonic and therefore may lead to inefficient allocations. However, UPC auctions may still be desirable for the buyer when...