We analyze a model of monopolistic price discrimination where only some consumers are originally sufficiently informed about their preferences, e.g., about their future demand for a utility such as electricity or telecommunication. When more consumers become informed, we show that this benefits...

In the standard monopolistic screening problem, buyers obtain information rent as a result of possessing private information; if a contract can be offered before the buyer knows his valuation, the seller can extract the full (expected) surplus. I consider a situation where the buyer may or may...

We analyze a model of monopolistic price discrimination where only some consumers are originally sufficiently informed about their preferences, e.g., about their future demand for a utility such as electricity or telecommunication. When more consumers become informed, we show that this benefits...

This paper aims to relate the principles of Ronald Coase Theorem with negative impacts of biotechnology, taking cases of specific research groups and medium-sized companies in biotechnology. We consider an application of economic theory on transaction costs (TEC) provides a good foundation for...

A firm may allow customers to learn the value of its product prior to buying it. This increases their willingness to pay, even though it also leads some not to buy. That strategy may also be used as a competitive tool to increase its product's attractiveness. This paper examines competition...

This paper analyzes optimal pricing for information goods under incomplete information, when both unlimited-usage (fixed-fee) pricing and usage-based pricing are feasible, and administering usage-based pricing may involve transaction costs. It is shown that offering fixed- fee pricing in...

This paper investigates how additional ex post private information by the agent affects the equilibrium outcome of the monopolistic screening model. In general, the principal always weakly benefits when the agent receives additional private information after the contracting stage. Instead, both...

This paper studies the effects of risk aversion on nonlinear pricing. It first develops a model of risk-averse principal, based on Mussa and Rosen (1978), and finds that the equilibrium allocation increases and approaches the efficient level as the principal's risk aversion increases and tends...

This document (of 279 pages) comprises the proceedings of a roundtable on predatory foreclosure held by the OECD's Competition Committee at the OECD in October 2004. The roundtable addressed various strategies that dominant firms use to eliminate or deter competition, focusing on predatory...

We present a market microstructure model to examine specialist's strategic participation decisions in a security market where there are noise traders, limit order traders, an insider and a specialist. We argue that the specialist's participation rate depends on the depth of the limit book and...