Showing 1 - 10 of 172
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828008
Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2007) describe two different models (Private Information Pareto Optimal and Incomplete Markets) of how households partially insure themselves against idiosyncratic shocks. They demonstrate that the models differ in terms of their implications for real exchange rates....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005690512
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We assume that individuals can fully insure themselves against cross-country shocks, but not against individual-specific shocks. We consider two particular models of limited risk-sharing: domestically incomplete markets (DI) and private information-Pareto optimal (PIPO) risk-sharing. For each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666410
In this paper, we consider a dynamic economy in which the agents are privately informed about their skills, which evolve stochastically over time in an arbitrary fashion. We consider an asset pricing equilibrium in which equilibrium quantities are constrained Pareto optimal. Under the assumption...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788895
This paper investigates whether a bank regulator should terminate problem banks promptly or exercise forbearance. We construct a dynamic model economy in which entrepreneurs pledge collateral, borrow from banks, and invest in long-term projects. We assume that collateral value has aggregate risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012711949
We consider an environment in which agents' skills are private information and follow arbitrary stochastic processes. We prove that it is typically Pareto optimal for an individual's marginal benefit of investing in capital to exceed his marginal cost of doing so. This wedge is consistent with a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005251262
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In this paper, I consider the problem of optimal unemployment insurance in a world in which the unemployed agent's job-finding effort is unobservable and his level of savings is unobservable. I show that the first-order approach is not always valid for this problem, and I argue that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085545
This paper provides a new rationalization for deposit insurance and systemic disintermediations. I consider an environment in which borrowers face no penalty for failing to repay obligations except the loss of their collateral. I assume that this collateral has aggregate risk. For a subset of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086865