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Certification as a Viable Quality Assurance Mechanism: Theory and Suggestive Evidence
Svitkova, Katarina; Ortmann, Andreas - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2006
particular solution of this problem, certification, where an independent agency provides a costly signal, a certificate, to … nonprofit. The assumptions of our model are derived from stylized facts that we distilled from certification systems currently … literature on certification and provides results that are different from those reported up to now. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357507
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Prompted to Be Good: The Impact of Certification on the Quality of Charities
Svitkova, Katarina - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2007
In this study we model how certification affects managers’ choice of the quality of the nonprofit organizations they … charitable good, one donor, and a certification agency. We assume that the nature of the charitable good does not allow for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086643
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Strategic Price Complexity in Retail Financial Markets
Carlin, Bruce I. - 2007
There is mounting empirical evidence to suggest that the law of one price is violated in retail financial markets: there is significant price dispersion even when products are homogeneous. Also, despite the large number of firms in the market, prices remain above marginal cost and may even rise...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012731344
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Indirect Evolution versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions
Dufwenberg, M.; Guth, W. - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Uppsala Universitet - 1998
Two major methods of explaining economic institutions, namely by strategic choices or through (indirect) evolution, are compared for the case of a homogenous quadratic duopoly market. Sellers either can provide incentives for agents to care for sales, or evolve as sellers who care for sales in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779794
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Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly
Schipper, Burkhard C. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
We analyze a symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round a l`a Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play a myopic best response to the opponents’ previous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785827
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The Demand for Information Services and the Market Structure
Holm, Håkan - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 1999
Our main conclusion is that the demand for information services that facilitate statistical screening between profitable and unprofitable sellers is highly sensitive to the market structure. A monopsonist will use information more extensively than would two or more buyers on the same market. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645196
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Renegotiation of Sales Contracts
Matthews, Steven A. - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 1993
Contracts adopted with later renegotiation in mind may take simple forms. In a principal-agent model, if renegotiation may occur after the agent chooses efforet, the principal protects against unfavorable renegotiation by "selling the project" to the agent via a sales contract. If only singleton...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766727
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Renegotiation of Sales Contracts under Moral Hazard
Matthews, Steven A. - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 1991
Sales contracts emerge when a principal and an agent in amoral hazard environment cannot prevent themselves from renegotiating their contract. The renegotiation occurs after the agent chooses his unobservable effort, but before its consequences are realized. Unlike previous analyses, a contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766769
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Information, Authority, and Corporate Hierarchies
Choe, Chongwoo; In-Uck, Park - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
In a typical corporate hierarchy, the manager is delegated the authority to make strategic decisions, and to contract with other employees. By studying a model with one principal and two agents where one agent can gather information that is valuable for the principal's project choice and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543778
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Cournot Duopoly with Capacity Limit Plants
Tramontana, Fabio; Gardini, Laura; TONU, Puu - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali, Facoltà … - 2008
This article considers a Cournot duopoly under an isoelastic demand function and cost functions with built-in capacity limits. The special feature is that each firm is assumed to operate multiple plants, which can be run alone or in combination. Each firm has two plants with different capacity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990644