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Analysis of the Short-Term Efficiency of Mechanisms of the Wholesale Electricity Market

Vasin, A.; Daylova, E. - In: Journal of the New Economic Association 18 (2013) 2, pp. 35-60

The authors consider theoretical models for mechanisms of the wholesale electricity market. Among them: Cournot auction …, first-price auction of supply functions, Vickrey auction, pay-as-bid auction, two-stage auction. Theoretical estimations of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010839447

Equilibrium, Auction, Multiple Substitutes and Complements

Shioura, Akiyoshi; Yang, Zaifu - Department of Economics and Related Studies, University … - 2013

We study a market model where there are n different types of indivisible goods for sale. The goods can be substitutable or complementary. There are multiple units of each good. Each agent may consume several goods and has quasi-linear utilities in money. We introduce a general condition which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678502

Overdemand and Underdemand in Economies with Indivisible Goods and Unit Demands

Talman, Dolf; Mishra, D. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2006

We study an economy where a collection of indivisible goods are sold to a set of buyers who want to buy at most one good.We characterize the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors in such an economy using sets of overdemanded and underdemanded goods.Further, we give characterizations for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091331

The Reality Game

Cherkashin, Dmitriy - 2009

We introduce an evolutionary game with feedback between perception and reality, which we call the reality game. It is a game of chance in which the probabilities for different objective outcomes (e.g., heads or tails in a coin toss) depend on the amount wagered on those outcomes. By varying the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012719441

Second-Price Auctions with Different Participation Costs

Cao, Xiaoyong; Tian, Guoqiang - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

This paper studies equilibria of second price auctions in independent private value envi- ronments with different participation costs. Two types of equilibria are identified: monotonic equilibria in which a bidder with a lower participation cost results in a lower cutoff for sub- mitting a bid,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260669

Dynamics in Non-Binding Procurement Auctions with Boundedly Rational Bidders

Colucci, Domenico; Doni, Nicola; Valori, Vincenzo - Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa, … - 2009

We study a procurement auction recently analysed by Gal-Or et al. (2007). In this auction game the buyer ranks …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005023693

On bidding markets: the role of competition

Loyola, Gino - Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - 2008

This paper analyzes the effects of industrial concentration on bidding behaviour and hence, on the seller´s expected proceeds. These effects are studied under the CIPI model, an affiliated value set-up that nests a variety of valuation and information environments. We formally decompose the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005111022

Asymmetric Supply Function Equilibrium with Constant Marginal Costs

Holmberg, Pär - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Uppsala Universitet - 2005

In a real-time electric power auction, the bids of producers consist of committed supply as a function of price. The …. I consider a uniform-price auction with a reservation price, where demand is inelastic and exceed the market capacity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771033

Equilibria in Second Price Auctions with Participation Costs

Yilankaya, Okan; Tan, Guofu - Vancouver School of Economics - 2004

We investigate equilibria of sealed-bid second price auctions with bidder participation costs in the independent private values environment. We focus on equilibria in which bidders use cut-off strategies (bid the valuation if it is greater than a certain cut-off point, otherwise do not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977018

Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations

MISHRA, Debasis; PARKES, David C. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2005

traditional definition, no ascending price auction can achieve the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) outcome for general private … valuations in the combinatorial auction setting. We relax this definition by allowing discounts to buyers from the final price of … the auction (or alternatively, calculating the discounts dynamically during the auction) while still maintaining a single …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043169

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