We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firm in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a...

This paper experimentally examines the relationship between self-reporting risk preferences and behavioral choices in the subsequently played dictator, ultimatum and investment games. The results from these experiments are used to discern the motivational bases of behavioral choices in the...

Core elements (a la Aubin) of a fuzzy game can be associated with additive separable supporting functions of fuzzy games. Generalized cores whose elements consist of more general separable supporting functions of the game are introduced and studied. While the Aubin core of unanimity games can be...

This paper investigates core stability of cooperative (TU) games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of a cooperative game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to reflect the core stability of the original game and vice...

We consider a principal-multiagent framework with adverse selection when contracting is possible ex ante. However, enforcement of contracts is imperfect, which results in inefficiencies. We study how group contracting may or may not mitigate those inefficiencies.

In this paper signals are observed by two receivers who have different preferences about the sender and therefore respond to information about himin different ways. This can result in a Catch-22 for the sender; if he sends a signal to induce a positive response from one receiver, this may induce...

We consider a bilateral trading problem in which one or both parties makes relationship-specific investments before trade. Without adequate contractual protection, the prospect of later holdups discourages investment. We postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to...

The principle of uncertain future: the probability of a future event contains a degree of (hidden) uncertainty. As a result, this uncertainty (in a sense, similar to vibrations, fluctuations) pushes the probability value back from the bounds to the middle of its range (from ~100% and ~0% to the...

In their recent work Thomas S. Schelling (2007, 2010), reiterating original arguments about game theory and its applications to social sciences. In particular, game theory helps to explore situations in which agents make decisions interdependent (strategic communication). Schelling's originality...

One of the main achievements of Herbert A. Simon in organizational theory is analytically evaluating the psychology of individual and collective behavior thus opening the ground for further research D. Kahneman, and T. Schelling. This article provides an assessment of the contributions of...