A substantial body of research investigates the design of incentives in firms, yet less is known about incentives in …. Third, contrary to existing laboratory evidence, financial incentives do not crowd out intrinsic motivation in this setting. < …

leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with non-integration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … division managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do …' incentives. The resulting tradeoff between a better use of resources and diminished incentives for effort determines whether …

leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with nonintegration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … division managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do …' incentives. The resulting tradeoff between a better use of resources and diminished incentives for effort determines whether …

separately and study issues of adverse selection (sorting) and moral hazard (incentives). We find that managers select contracts … incentives to do so (shirking). As a result, the market is skeptical of incentive benefits. Thus, while we find evidence of …

A substantial body of research investigates the design of incentives in firms, yet less is known about incentives in …. Third, contrary to existing laboratory evidence, financial incentives do not crowd out intrinsic motivation in this setting. …

obtain evidence on the effect of stronger incentives on productive and destructive effort. Using as control the behavior of … the same teams in a competition that experienced no changes in incentives, we provide differences-in-differences estimates …, and that indeed attendance suffered as a result of the incentive change. Thus, teams responded to stronger incentives, but …

When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a “good” allocation of effort across …