While the global financial crisis was centered in the United States, it led to a surprising appreciation in the dollar, suggesting global dollar illiquidity. In response, the Federal Reserve partnered with other central banks to inject dollars into the international financial system. Empirical...

While the global financial crisis was centered in the United States, it led to a surprising appreciation in the dollar, suggesting global dollar illiquidity. In response, the Federal Reserve partnered with other central banks to inject dollars into the international financial system. Empirical...

In this paper we connect the events of the last twelve months, "The Panic of 2008" as it has been called, to the demand for international reserves. In previous work, we have shown that international reserve demand can be rationalized by a central bank's desire to backstop the broad money supply...

Most interpretations of the Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis of 1992/3 ignore the key role played by structural policy spillovers among European countries, and overlook the effects of coordination (or lack thereof) of monetary and exchange rate policies among the countries making up the periphery...

The paper argues that real world fixed exchange rate regimes usually have finite bands instead of completely fixed exchange rates between realignments because exchange rate bands, contrary to the textbook result, give central banks some monetary independence even with free international capital...

The paper analyses the modalities and consequences of a breakdown of cooperation between the monetary authorities of inflation-prone periphery countries that use an exchange rate peg as an anti-inflationary device, when the centre is hit by an aggregate demand shock. Cooperation in the periphery...

This paper discusses what we have learned from last year's currency crises in the ERM and Nordic countries about fixed exchange rates as a means to achieve price stability. After discussing the explanations for the crises, the paper concludes that fixed exchange rates are not a short cut to...

Microeconomic efficiency and market transparency argue in favour of UK membership in EMU and for Scotland's membership in the UK monetary union and also in EMU. UK seigniorage (government revenues from money issuance) would be boosted by EMU membership. Lender of last resort arrangements would...

The Asian crisis highlighted the difficulties for developing countries to actively manage exchange rates in an environment of high capital mobility. Now it became fashionable to argue that the exchange rate should be either allowed to float freely or irrevocably fixed. This paper examines the...

If Stage Three of EMU starts on 1 January 1999, transition issues remain on two time scales. Until 1 July 2002, national currencies and the euro coexist as legal tender. We argue that intra-EMU currency risk exists in principle during that period, but that no EMU member can be forced out through...