In the experimental scenario several agents repeatedly invest in n (n = 2) state-speciïfic assets. The evolutionarily stable and equilibrium (Blume and Easley, 1992) portfolio for this situation requires to distribute funds according to the constant probabilities of the various states. The...

In this paper we experimentally test skewness seeking at the individual level. Several prospects that can be ordered with respect to the third-degree stochastic dominance (3SD) criterion are ranked by the participants of the experiment. We ï¬nd that the skewness of a distribution has a...

In this paper, we experimentally test skewness preferences at the individual level. Several prospects that can be ordered with respect to the third-degree stochastic dominance criterion are ranked by the participants of the experiment. We find that the skewness of a distribution has a...

In this paper we study the distribution of power in the Council of the European Union (EU). The goal of this paper is to evaluate the voting power of the member states after the entry of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). The analysis is based on the Shapley-Shubik power index of...

In a fair division game an indivisible object with an unknown common value is owned by a group of individuals and should be allocated to one of them while the others are compensated monetarily. Implementing fair division games in the lab, we fi nd many occurrences of the winner's curse under the...

Being a "jack-of-all-trades" increases the probability of running an entrepreneurial venture successfully; but what happens to "jack-of-few-trades" who lack sufficient skills? This paper investigates a possible compensation mechanism between balanced skills and cities, and how this compensatory...