Opportunistic behaviour due to incomplete contract enforcement is a risk in many economic transactions such as forest carbon sequestration contracts. In this paper, an enforcement-proof incentive contract is developed in which a buyer demands a guaranteed delivery of a good or service given a...

Opportunistic behaviour due to incomplete contract enforcement is a risk in many economic transactions such as forest carbon sequestration contracts. In this paper, an enforcement-proof incentive contract is developed in which a buyer demands a guaranteed delivery of a good or service given a...

Opportunistic behaviour due to imperfect contract enforcement is a risk in many economic transactions. In this paper, an enforcement-proof incentive contract is developed in which a buyer demands a guaranteed delivery of a good or service given a productive upfront payment, moral hazard in...

In this paper we challenge the conventional view that strikes are caused by asymmetric information regarding firm profitability such that union members are uninformed. Instead, we build an expressive model of strikes where the perception of unfairness provides the expressive benefit of voting...

The expansion of a given land use may affect deforestation directly if forests are cleared to free land for this use, or indirectly, via the displacement of other land-use activities from non-forest areas towards the forest frontier. Unlike direct land conversion, indirect land-use changes...

Coasean arguments against the Pigouvian perspective are well established. A central tenet in this criticism argues that a Pigouvian tax may be a source of inefficiency: if parties were to bargain in the presence of a Pigouvian tax, (allocative) inefficiencies would occur-the so-called...

Enacting market-based environmental regulation, such as emissions taxes and cap-and-trade programs, often create rents that are contested by agents. In this paper, we create a framework that compares social welfare from alternative market-based environmental policy instruments under the presence...

The conventional economic argument favors the use of market-based instruments over ‘command-and-control’ regulation. This viewpoint, however, is often limited in the description and characteristics of the latter; namely, environmental standards are often portrayed as lacking...

We investigate the efficiency of Coasean bargaining when restrictions are placed on the set of feasible bargaining outcomes. When property rights are costly to (defend) appropriate, we find that bargaining restrictions may be Pareto superior to unconstrained voluntary exchange. Under cost...

We investigate the efficiency of Coasean bargaining when transfers between agents are capped. We model a two-stage Coasean environment where, in the first stage, property rights are costly to attribute. After the attribution stage agents voluntarily exchange over the level of harm. If property...