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Coalitional manipulation on networks
Ju, Biung-Ghi - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 2, pp. 627-662
by an exogenous network (a non-directed graph) so that only connected subsets of agents can form a coalition. We offer a … full characterization of non-manipulable rules without any assumption on the network structure. This result yields a … variety of useful corollaries for specific networks such as complete network, trees, and networks without a “bridge”, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043011
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A Single-Mindedness model with n generations
Emanuele, Canegrati - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
In this paper I will analyse the redistribution of income amongst n generations using the Single-mindedness Theory. I will introduce a new expression for the balanced-budget constraint, no longer based on lump- sum transfers as in the traditional literature, but rather on more realistic labour...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835397
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N-Person cake-cutting: there may be no perfect division
Brams, Steven J.; Jones, Michael A.; Klamler, Christian - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
A cake is a metaphor for a heterogeneous, divisible good, such as land. A perfect division of cake is efficient (also called Pareto-optimal), envy-free, and equitable. We give an example of a cake in which it is impossible to divide it among three players such that these three properties are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009325605
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Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited
Andersson, Tommy; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2006
This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419350
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Rationality and Solutions to Nonconvex Bargaining Problems: Rationalizability and Nash Solutions
Xu, Yongsheng; Yoshihara, Naoki - Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University - 2012
Conditions α and β are two well-known rationality conditions in the theory of rational choice. This paper examines the implications of weaker versions of these two rationality conditions in the context of solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems. It is shown that, together with the standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011014394
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Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability
ANDERSSON, Tommy; EHLERS, Lars; SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie … - 2010
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671538
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Why people reach intermediate agreements? Axiomatic and strategic justifications
Gómez, José M. Jiménez - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2010
As Roemer (1986) points out, things become more interesting once we include information. In this paper, following the line started by Jiménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil (2008), we define both a lower and an upper bounds on awards in the framework of the Lorenz-Bifocal Bankruptcy Problem (Gadea et al....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008678231
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Non-Manipulable House Allocation with Rent Control
Andersson, Tommy; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2012
In many real-life house allocation problems, rents are bounded from above by price ceilings imposed by a government or a local administration. This is known as rent control. Because some price equilibria may be disqualified given such restrictions, this paper proposes an alternative equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010798193
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Congestion in irrigation problems
Jaramillo, Paula - UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE - 2013
Consider a problem in which the cost of building an irrigation canal has to be divided among a set of people. Each person has different needs. When the needs of two or more people overlap, there is congestion. In problems without congestion, a unique canal serves all the people and it is enough...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010763922
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Least Manipulable Envy-free Rules in Economies with Indivisibilities
Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan - 2012
We consider envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In "small" economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818647