hold excess capacity not for entry deterrence but for getting higher benefit from other business strategy such as licensing …The theoretical literature on industrial organization has been argued that firms hold excess capacity to deter entry ….We show that co-existence of licensing and excess capacity can be found if the marginal costs of the firms are small enough. …

The literature on technology licensing has ignored the importance of market power of the input supplier. In this paper … we examine the impact of licensing in the downstream industry when the firms in the upstream industry have market power …. We show that licensing in the downstream industry can make the upstream industry more competitive. However, licensing in …

The literature on technology licensing has ignored the importance of market power of the input supplier. In this paper … we examine the impact of licensing in the downstream industry when the firms in the upstream industry have market power …. We show that licensing in the downstream industry can make the upstream industry more competitive. However, licensing in …

an 'incumbent bidder' that owns a complement or substitute. With an auction on the transfer (i.e. payment) to the … government, the incumbent is advantaged.If the government regulates the market with an auction on the price asked to consumers …, it depends who is advantaged. With complements, the incumbent is advantaged: it can set a lower price on the new …

We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms. Our treatments … vary with respect to three factors: sequential vs. block or simultaneous entry, the cost functions of entrants and the … amount of time during which incumbents are protected from entry. Before entry incumbents are able to collude in all cases …

We analyze firms’ entry, production and hedging decisions under imperfect competition. We consider an oligopoly … industry producing a homogeneous output in which risk-averse firms face an entry cost upon entering the industry, and then … literature (without entry), both production and output price depend on uncertainty and risk aversion. Specifically, when entry is …

Antitrust authorities regard the possibility of post-merger entry and merger-generated efficiencies as two factors that … demand, all entry-inducing mergers harm consumer welfare. This is because if there is entry following a merger, it implies …