The effect that exogenous mistakes, made by players choosing their strategies, have on the dynamic stability for the replicator dynamic is analyzed for both asymmetric and symmetric normal form games. Through these perturbed games, the dynamic solution concept of limit asymptotic stability is...

Individuals repeatedly face a multi-decision task with unknown payoff distributions. They have minimal memory and update their strategy by observing previous play (and not strategy) of someone else. We select behavior rules that increase average payoffs as often as possible in a large population...

The analysis of the replicator dynamic in generic perfect information games yields the following results. In the long run, players play a Nash equilibrium provided that initially all strategies are present. There is at most one ``stable'' component (formally, an interior asymptotically stable...

The evolutionary basis for predicting the backwards induction solution in generic finite extensive-form games with perfect information is examined. Evolution is modelled using the replicator dynamic in combination with rare mutations that introduce a small change in the proportion of each...