We provide an evolutionary foundation to evidence that in some situations humans maintain optimistic or pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty about opponents’ actions and...

We extend the notion of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies introduced by Maynard Smith and Price (Nature 246:15–18, <CitationRef CitationID="CR6">1973</CitationRef>) for models ruled by a single fitness matrix A, to the framework of stochastic games developed by Lloyd Shapley (Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 39:1095–1100, <CitationRef CitationID="CR13">1953</CitationRef>) where, at...</citationref></citationref>

The risk-neutral equilibrium bidding strategy for first-price auctions with independent private values is justified without assuming a well-defined Bayesian game. Bidders, aware of their own value, assume the private values to be linearly related. The latter, however, are independent and...

This paper introduces two new concepts in evolutionary game theory: Nash equilibrium with Group Selection (NEGS) and Evolutionarily Stable Strategy with Group Selection (ESSGS). These concepts generalize Maynard Smith and Price (1973) to settings with arbitrary matching rules, inparticular they...

This discourse offers a solution to The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development on islands. This hypothesis offers a foundational, sub-game solution to The Island Survival Game, a counterintuitive, dominant economic development strategy for ‘islands’ (and relatively insular states). This...

The effect that exogenous mistakes, made by players choosing their strategies, have on the dynamic stability for the replicator dynamic is analyzed for both asymmetric and symmetric normal form games. Through these perturbed games, the dynamic solution concept of limit asymptotic stability is...

We extend the notions of evolutionary stability and, for the first time, that of neutral stability to asymmetric games played between two populations. Stability with respect to simultaneous entry of a small proportion of mutants into both populations is considered. Allocations where neither...

This paper considers a large population, game theoretic job-search problem, in which the ratio of job searchers to jobs is α. There are n distinct types of jobs, each with an associated value. Each searcher can only accept one job and cannot recall a job previously rejected. Once a searcher...