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We investigate infinitely repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. We focus on a class of games where the payoff functions are additively separable and the signal for monitoring a player's action does not depend on the other player's action. Tit-for-tat strategies function very well in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008519713
We model the stock market as a timing game, in which arbitrageurs who are not expected to be certainly rational compete over profit by bursting the bubble caused by investors' euphoria. The manager raises money by issuing shares and the arbitrageurs use leverage. If leverage is weakly regulated,...
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We investigate multiple regions in which coordination games are exclusively played by their participants. For every region, there exist a number of immobile individuals locked into this region. There also exist mobile individuals who look out for chances to move into more beneficial regions, but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005465333
The situation in which a decision maker is confronted with decision making problems infinitely many times is considered. She does not know the state-dependent stochastic payoffs, and learns from past experiences according to some adaptive learning rule. She is motivated by the maximization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005465380
In this paper, we will argue that it is essential to incorporate bounded rationality into game theory. Game theory has been applied to economics such as industrial organization on the basis of the naïve interpretation of game theory, which requires players to be ideally rational in an extremely...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005467415
This paper investigates the implementation problem of a social choice function in the complete information environments. We investigate a partial revelation mechanism, in which, each player announces only opinions about her own and two neighbors' utility indices. We require that for every...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005467461
This paper presents a theoretical foundation of the possibility that multimarket contact enhances firms' abilities to sustain implicit collusion. When firms operate in a single market and cannot perfectly monitor the opponents' choices of supply, it is impossible to achieve efficiency among...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005467481