We investigate multiple regions in which coordination games are exclusively played by their participants. For every region, there exist a number of immobile individuals locked into this region. There also exist mobile individuals who look out for chances to move into more beneficial regions, but...

The situation in which a decision maker is confronted with decision making problems infinitely many times is considered. She does not know the state-dependent stochastic payoffs, and learns from past experiences according to some adaptive learning rule. She is motivated by the maximization of...

In this paper, we will argue that it is essential to incorporate bounded rationality into game theory. Game theory has been applied to economics such as industrial organization on the basis of the naïve interpretation of game theory, which requires players to be ideally rational in an extremely...

This paper investigates the implementation problem of a social choice function in the complete information environments. We investigate a partial revelation mechanism, in which, each player announces only opinions about her own and two neighbors' utility indices. We require that for every...

This paper presents a theoretical foundation of the possibility that multimarket contact enhances firms' abilities to sustain implicit collusion. When firms operate in a single market and cannot perfectly monitor the opponents' choices of supply, it is impossible to achieve efficiency among...

This paper investigates the situation of strategic conflict in which players have limited prior knowledge about the objective game, that is, they do not know their true, objective payoff functions, and therefore, have to formulate their own payoff functions based on their past experiences in a...

This paper considers a situation in which a decision maker chooses between the safe action and the uncertain action infinitely many times. The decision maker knows the payoff for the safe action, but does not know the payoff for the uncertain action which is determined by an unknown probability...

We incorporate social influence into implementation theory, and highlight the manner in which an informed agent feels guilty with regard to disobeying an uninformed principal’s wishes. The degree of this feeling depends on the agent’s expectation of others’ behavioral modes....

We examine the impact of financial regulation and innovation on bubbles and crashes due to limited arbitrage by modeling timing games among strategic arbitrageurs whose rationality is not commonly known. An unproductive company raises funds by issuing shares, and for purchasing shares,...

We formulate strategic aspects of speculative arbitrageurs in a stock market as a generalization of timing game with behavioral types explored by Matsushima (2013b). A company raises huge funds during the bubble driven by positive feedback traders’ euphoria by issuing shares in a socially...