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How can a prosecutor, who has only limited resources, credibly threaten so many defendants with costly and risky trials and extract plea bargains involving harsh sentences? Had defendants refused to settle, many of them would not have been charged or would have escaped with lenient sanctions....
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This article examines the stickiness of default rules and boilerplate terms in contract law. It argues that parties who choose to deviate from well entrenched defaults may face hurdles beyond the direct transaction costs of drafting. The mere deviation from standard terms by a proposing party...
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Legal rights may erode as a result of past, uncontested, breach. In light of ongoing violations, the rightholder's enforcement may result in the loss of the entitlement. The doctrines, of course, of performance in contract law and adverse possession in property law are prominent examples of this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010536534
Legal rights may erode as a result of past, uncontested, breach. In light of ongoing violations, the rightholder's enforcement may result in the loss of the entitlement. The doctrines, of course, of performance in contract law and adverse possession in property law are prominent examples of this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010536615
European law gives consumers the right to withdraw from a range of contracts for goods and services; American law, with narrow exceptions, does not. Yet merchants in the United States frequently provide by contract that consumers have the right to return goods. We analyze the right to withdraw...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321307
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This paper argues that enforcement of an agreement, reached under a threat to refrain from dealing, should be conditioned solely on the credibility of the threat. When a credible threat exists, enforcement of the agreement promotes both social welfare and the interests of the threatened party....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010843083
This article offers a new mechanism of private enforcement, combining sanctions and rewards into a scheme of "reversible rewards." The enforcing party sets up a pre-committed fund and offers it as reward to another party to refrain from violation. If the violator turns down the reward, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010812175